Add your header text here

Get to know the School

Headquarters

+300 Teachers

Featured programs

Master

E-learning

E-learning

Master

E-learning

E-learning

Programs

What our students say

What our teachers say

Success stories

Objective of
Air Safety

Air safety (which should not be confused with aeronautical safety) aims to prevent criminal acts against aircraft and their passengers and crew. Following the terrible attacks of 2001, the Union adopted a series of security measures aimed at protecting civil aviation. These rules are periodically updated according to the evolution of risks. Member States may apply stricter standards.

What is a sterile area of an airport?

Air safety aims to prevent acts of unlawful interference through a combination of measures and human and material resources, primarily by preventing the introduction of objects that may constitute a threat, such as weapons or explosives, into aircraft.

After being given importance for decades, air safety became a major concern following the terrorist attacks of September 2001. Since then, the regulatory framework applicable in this area has been significantly strengthened worldwide, both at the national level and through international agreements and cooperation or through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and Annex 17 of the Chicago Convention and the Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP). The European Union, for its part, has developed an appropriate policy that is periodically updated to adapt to new risks and threats, as well as technological progress.

History of
Air Safety

The first significant step in air safety came with the International Convention on Civil Aviation in Chicago (USA) in 1944. Specifically, this Convention included a specific annex on air safety, number 17, Security: Safeguarding International Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference.

In addition, it was agreed to establish a permanent body to continue the work of the International Commission for Air Navigation that was born from the Paris Convention of 1919. Initially, this body was called the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization, PICAO, until 1947 when it became known as the International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO, once the Convention was ratified by the Member States.

In 1965, the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, commonly known as the Tokyo Convention, was held in Tokyo (Japan). This international treaty came into force in 1969 and by 2015 had been ratified by 186 countries. For the first time in the history of international aviation law, it recognized certain powers and immunities of the aircraft commander. Thus, on international flights, the commander could restrain any person who was committing or about to commit a crime, persons who might interfere with the safety of persons or property on board, or persons who endanger order and discipline.

Starting in 1968, unlawful aircraft seizures multiplied and spread across many regions of the world. This development led ICAO to create, in less than two years, a convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft, adopted in The Hague (Netherlands) in 1970. This Convention marked a decisive moment in international criminal prosecution and has served as a model for numerous instruments that reproduce its fundamental provisions. The convention has a broad scope of application: its text applies to any aircraft in which a seizure occurs, whether it’s a transport or general aviation aircraft, used for commercial or non-commercial purposes. Only military, customs, or police aircraft were excluded.

The following year, in 1971, a new convention based on The Hague model was signed in Montreal (Canada) to ensure the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Currently, 186 States are parties to this instrument. The aforementioned convention aims to suppress acts of air terrorism that it enumerates in its text:

  • Acts against persons on board aircraft in flight that pose a problem for the safety of the aircraft.
  • Acts that destroy aircraft in service or render them incapable of flight.
  • Placement of explosive devices that destroy or incapacitate the aircraft.
  • Sabotage of air navigation facilities or services.

In 1974, ICAO published Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation regarding Security: Safeguarding International Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Interference. This annex laid the foundation for ICAO’s civil aviation security program and aims to safeguard civil aviation and its facilities and services against acts of unlawful interference. The measures adopted by ICAO to prevent and suppress all acts of interference against civil aviation worldwide are of crucial importance for the future of civil aviation and the entire international community.

Annex 17 deals essentially with administrative and coordination aspects, as well as technical measures to protect the security of international air transport. Additionally, it requires each contracting State to establish its own civil aviation security program incorporating supplementary security measures that may be proposed by other competent bodies.

Another objective of Annex 17 is to coordinate the activities of those involved in security programs. It is recognized that airline operators have the primary responsibility to protect their passengers, property, and revenue, and therefore States must ensure that carriers prepare and implement complementary and effective security programs that are compatible with those of the airports from which they operate their services.

The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, was a massive coordinated attack. 19 men on a suicide mission hijacked 4 planes with the aim of crashing them into specific targets.

The unlawful seizure of aircraft on 9/11 marked a before and after in international aviation security. At the international level, there was an attempt to respond to the attacks. On September 25, 2001, the ICAO assembly in Montreal proposed the inclusion of the following measures in the text of Annex 17:

  • Administrative structures responsible for preventing acts of unlawful interference.
  • Airport controls designed in such a way that access to weapons and explosives is impossible.
  • Framework for international cooperation.

At the 2003 Evian Summit, the G8 supported the initiatives proposed by ICAO and established a joint plan for aviation security that included the following measures:

  • Enhanced systems for access to the aircraft cockpit.
  • Implementation of ICAO’s Aviation Security Action Plan.
  • Review of security procedures.
  • Implementation of security measures corresponding to a higher threat level.

The 2010 Beijing Convention (China) modernized and consolidated the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, expanded and complemented the classification of criminal offenses, and specifically established criminal responsibility for instigators and organizers of a crime.

In recent years, two new types of threats have emerged as primary risks to aviation security: on one hand, Islamic terrorism and its associated propaganda, and on the other hand, cybersecurity related to airports and aircraft. In this regard, and given the growing concern of all parties involved in the sector, ICAO approved resolution A39-19 in 2016, which provides instructions on how to address cybersecurity in civil aviation. This is a sector that is increasingly dependent on the fragility of systems and components that make it vulnerable to threats and incidents that can compromise both physical and operational security.

Historical events of aviation security failures

In the early days of powered flight, countless sacrifices were made. Aircraft construction and engineering had many catastrophic failures, exacerbated by adverse weather conditions and pilot errors. However, these tragedies have helped make flying as safe as it is today.

Currently, the Rolls-Royce logo on passenger aircraft engines is a guarantee of trouble-free maneuvers and reliable power; however, in July 1910, at the age of 32, Charles Rolls died in Bournemouth (England) when the tail of his Wright Flyer fell off. It was the first fatal British aviation accident.

Another Briton, Roy Chadwick, the designer of the legendary Lancaster with Rolls-Royce Merlin engine and the remarkable Vulcan V bomber, died in August 1947 when his Avro Tudor passenger aircraft prototype crashed in the Lake District due to a maintenance error.

Chadwick crashed and died at the very moment when a new post-war aviation industry was taking off.

Undoubtedly, during the 1950s, the development of fast jet flight led to the deaths of legions of test pilots. But these accidents generated improvements and technical changes in operations and laws that made civil aviation increasingly safer.

One of the most shocking cases was the year when three new de Havilland Comet aircraft broke apart in mid-flight accidents. Put into service by the British state airline BOAC in 1952, the Comet was the world’s first passenger jet.

It was a beauty. It could cross the Atlantic in style and, for a while, it seemed that Great Britain would truly lead the jet age. However, due to insufficient knowledge about metal fatigue, new construction techniques, and repeated pressurization of passenger aircraft cabins, the early Comets failed spectacularly.

In 1953 and 1954, three Comet aircraft broke down shortly after takeoff. All on board perished, two in January and April of the same year, while ascending over the Mediterranean from Rome’s Ciampino airport, and a third caught in an electrical storm on the route between Calcutta and New Delhi on a BOAC flight.

Comet flights were suspended and production of the British jet was halted.

The investigations that followed paved a new path in aviation safety. Led by Arnold Hall, director of the Royal Aircraft Establishment, a team of engineers and scientists reconstructed the disaster debris and subjected one of the aircraft hulls to pressurization tests in a giant water tank.

This is how they discovered what the error had been. There were cracks in the Comet fuselages around doors and windows because the aircraft were subjected to repeated pressurization cycles. This is because the fuselage is pressurized for passenger comfort at the start of each flight and depressurized when the engines stop. As that particular form of riveted construction could not withstand the stretching of the aircraft hull, the Comet planes had flown apart.

The installation of rounded windows instead of square ones (which also caused cracks) and other improvements made later Comets safer.

In fact, the final model of the jet, the Nimrod for aerial reconnaissance, was in service with the RAF – British Royal Air Force – until June 2011, more than 60 years after the first flight of the Comet 1.

A collision over the Grand Canyon, which occurred in June 1956, for example, between a TWA Super Constellation and a United Airlines DC-7, the first commercial aircraft crash that totaled over a hundred deaths, led to improvements in air traffic control.

Other notable accidents led to useful developments such as Crew Resource Management (personnel working at all times as a cross-checking team), smoke detectors and automatic fire extinguishers in bathrooms and cargo holds, transponders, and fire-resistant materials.

But even then, airlines have demanded too much from these reliable jets, expecting these winged workhorses like the Boeing 737 (there are 8,000 built) to fly all day long.

In April 1988, a part of the fuselage of an Aloha 737 flying from Hilo to Honolulu failed at 24,000 feet. A flight attendant was swept overboard, and all other passengers survived. It was later discovered that the Boeing had undergone a total of 89,000 repressurizations, while the early Comets had failed with between 900 and 3,060 repressurizations.

As a result, the FAA established its National Aging Aircraft Research Program, with a full-scale aircraft evaluation building in New Jersey. This allowed for predictive testing of structural fatigue, corrosion, and many other aspects to increase aircraft safety not only in the U.S. but worldwide.

The vital importance of knowing the exact structural condition of a specific aircraft was highlighted in August 1985 when a Japanese airline’s Boeing 747 flying from Tokyo to Osaka lost cabin pressure, along with its hydraulic fluids and vertical stabilizer.

The crew fought valiantly to find a way to land the affected aircraft, but it crashed, and 520 of the people on board died. Miraculously, there were four survivors.

The Jumbo had always seemed like a very safe aircraft, however, on this occasion, a deteriorated repair made several years earlier on the bulkhead separating the passenger cabin from the tail broke, as had the fuselages of those early Comet aircraft.

There is always something new to learn, and safety standards to tighten. A Swissair MD-11, for example, caught fire and exploded, killing all 229 people on board, shortly after taking off on a flight from New York’s JFK airport to Rome in September 1998. The cause was a fire in the aircraft’s entertainment system. As a result, new fire-resistant materials were applied.

In July 2000, a loose piece of metal fell on the runway from a Continental Airlines DC-10 and cut one of the tires of a Concorde taking off from Charles de Gaulle Airport, near Paris.

The debris caused a pressure wave that ruptured a fuel tank, and its contents ignited, probably due to a cut electrical wire. The plane caught fire and crashed into a hotel. All 100 passengers, nine crew members, and four hotel employees died. It was the first fatal accident in the history of the super-safe Mach 2 aircraft and, although fuel tanks and tires were improved, it led to the retirement of the Concorde three years later.

Our air travel is now incredibly safe because some very hard lessons were learned along the way.

Air Safety
in Spain

Air safety in Spain is unequivocally linked to civil aviation policy and regulations. The main areas of activity for the regulator in terms of air safety include airport and air navigation infrastructures, air transport, general aviation, professionals and entities that carry out activities related to civil aviation, and the end users of these activities.

Who regulates air safety in Spain?

The Directorate General of Civil Aviation is the body that designs the air safety strategy and defines aeronautical policy, drafts and proposes regulations, and coordinates the agencies, entities, and bodies attached to the Department with civil aviation functions.

The State Aviation Safety Agency, responsible for ensuring the safety of civil aviation and protecting users’ rights, is one of these entities, and works with full functional independence to best achieve its goals.

Air safety law in Spain

The Air Safety Law 21/2003 of July 7 (LSA) [complements the Air Navigation Law 48/1960 (LNA)] includes the aviation competencies of the various state agencies, accident and incident investigation, inspection activities, safety obligations, infractions, and sanctions.

As stated in Article 1, the Air Safety Law 21/2003 (LSA) aims to:

  • Determine the competencies of the General State Administration bodies in matters of civil aviation.
  • Regulate the technical investigation of civil aviation accidents and incidents.
  • Establish the legal framework for aeronautical inspection.
  • Establish obligations for air safety reasons.
  • Establish the system of infractions and sanctions in civil aviation matters.


Its provisions are aimed at preserving the safety, order, and fluidity of air traffic and transport, in accordance with the principles and norms of international law regulating civil aviation.

Main factors that compromise
Air Safety

Whenever we receive news of an aviation accident, our first thoughts lead us to wonder, in addition to whether all the people on board are alright, “why did it happen?” or directly “whose fault is it?”

We know, from statistics provided by some aviation authorities, that a significant percentage of aviation accidents occur due to factors associated with technical maintenance. In these cases, it wouldn’t help much to prevent it from happening again if we only focused on finding someone to blame (the “who”) without also worrying about understanding the reasons (the “why”).

To analyze this, we must start by giving a simple but very true answer: “someone made a mistake because they are human”. This is not intended to justify, but to make us aware of the importance of analyzing the factors that affect human beings and lead them to make mistakes and be vulnerable. The factors that make us more vulnerable cannot always be eliminated, but if we know them, we can take actions that eliminate their negative impact, or at least mitigate their consequences. That said, we proceed to provide a list of the main factors that compromise air safety:

Foreign objects

The movement area of an airport is a critical zone where the improper presence of objects such as stones, nuts, papers, rags, plastics, pens, coins, etc. is not admissible for operational safety.

For safe aircraft operation, the implementation of different prevention and protection programs is necessary. AESA’s FOD (Foreign Object Debris) risk management program includes measures to be taken to avoid damage to aircraft, people, or facilities caused by foreign objects or debris in the airport’s movement area.

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), while acknowledging the lack of standardization in international regulations regarding the definition and taxonomy of FOD, in its Annex 14 defines FOD as “Inanimate object within the movement area which has no operational or aeronautical function and can represent a hazard to aircraft operations”.

Although there will always be risks associated with the possible improper presence of objects in areas as large as those covered by the airport’s movement area, these risks can be reduced through the implementation of an FOD risk management program and the effective and efficient use of FOD detection and removal equipment. The term FOD includes a wide range of materials, including loose parts, pavement fragments, construction materials, luggage parts, or wildlife remains. The most typical objects that can be found in the movement area.

Human factors

Human factors concern people and refer to their relationship in work environments and their interaction with machines, equipment, procedures, and other people in the system. Human factors work to achieve optimal behavior of people through the systematic application of human sciences whose objective is safety and effectiveness. A correct combination between man and machine should respond to the following indicators:

  • Efficiency: allows obtaining results without difficulty or excessive effort on the part of the operator.
  • Safety: minimization of risks.
  • Comfort and acceptability: adaptation and flexibility in job performance.

The human element is the most flexible and adaptable part of the aeronautical system; being the most vulnerable to external conditions that can negatively modify behavior. No person can perform their job perfectly at all times. Therefore, it is important to recognize that failure can occur.

Human factors deal with various elements of the aeronautical system including: human behavior and performance, decision-making, control and display design, cockpit ergonomics, communications, maps, charts and documentation; as well as personnel development and training.

ICAO recognizes that cockpit problems relate to poor decision-making, ineffective communications, inadequate leadership and poor management of available resources, and therefore published in 1989 circulars 216 – AN/131 “Human Factors Digest No. 1: Fundamental Concepts” and 317-AN/132 on “Human Factors Digest No. 2 regarding Flight Crew Training”. It thus proposed the levels of expertise necessary for any civil aviation organization.

  • Level 1: All personnel understand human behavior, capabilities, and limitations.
  • Level 2: Reviews for those occupying supervisory, inspection, and instructional roles.
  • Level 3: Internal specialist, airlines should have one or more for flight activities.
  • Level 4: Human factors consultant, should have knowledge in psychology with a focus on human factors study.

Concepts and skills that pilots must acquire:

  • Language standardization.
  • Concept of synergy.
  • Teamwork.
  • Flight competency.
  • Environmental impact (air traffic control).
  • Resource identification.
  • Priority identification.
  • Characteristics of human behavior.
  • Identification of norms and procedures.

Skills:

  • Communications and interpersonal skills.
  • Situational awareness.
  • Problem-solving: decision-making.
  • Direction and control.
  • Stress management.
  • Situation review.

Finally, although CRM methodology has already been worked on and applied, aviation companies must work every day on continuous improvement of the human factor to manage errors, minimize and prevent incidents and accidents, generating a culture of safety with quality.

Meteorological factors

Aeronautical meteorology is an essential element of the complex system that constitutes Air Traffic Management (ATM). Meteorology affects all aspects of ATM operations and helps improve safety and efficiency during Air Traffic Control (ATC) operations.

What influence does meteorology have on airport operations?

The ability to forecast adverse and/or extreme weather situations can become a very useful tool to anticipate possible problems and incidents that may affect air traffic management. For this reason, weather forecasting becomes a key element in decision-making that allows diagnosing adverse situations and thus activating preventive actions to try to avoid and mitigate possible negative impacts caused by upcoming weather conditions. For example, wind forecasts, as well as other meteorological variables at different flight levels, can help find the most suitable route between an origin and a destination. A convective precipitation forecast can locate convective cells with high vertical velocities that may pose a danger to aircraft nearby. Predicting the severity of turbulence and icing is a great help when planning the flight route to locate critical points of the route to avoid.

According to studies conducted by the National Safety Board (Aviation Accident and Incident Database), Plane Crash Information, and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), aviation accidents due to meteorological causes were reduced from 31% in the 1990s to 24% during the period between 2003 and 2007. Currently, aviation accidents due to adverse weather conditions are around 17%. Likewise, adverse weather conditions are the main cause of aviation accidents and incidents that occur during the descent phase, initial and final approach, landing, initial and final climb, and takeoff phase. However, despite the fact that the percentages of incidents and accidents due to meteorological causes are decreasing year after year, the impact of meteorology on aeronautical activities is still very high, both from the point of view of air safety and the economy.

How can air management and safety be improved?

Sudden changes in wind direction and speed, the presence of wind shear, low visibility situations, and other adverse weather conditions are the main factors to consider when planning ATM operations. This is why having high-resolution weather forecast information is essential for planning and ensuring the safety of air operations both at airports and on air routes. Therefore, it is necessary to provide ATMs with forecasted meteorological information, using the most advanced numerical weather prediction (NWP) techniques.

In order to meet the objectives, expectations, and needs of the aeronautical community, meteorological information for aviation must improve day by day in quality and availability. To achieve this, it must adapt to the operational requirements of aeronautical users, require better measurement instruments both on the surface and at altitude, maintain continuous atmospheric monitoring, and increase the application of new prediction methods in relation to variables with aeronautical impact, particularly in short-term forecasting.

Wildlife

The presence of birds and other animals in the vicinity of airports poses a risk to the safety of air operations. Collisions can lead to events of varying operational severity: damage to sensitive areas of the aircraft, engine shutdowns, or emergency declarations, among others. In addition to the real-time management required by the crew, air traffic disruptions can occur if the impact happens during landing or takeoff, as the runway must be inspected to ensure no animal remains are present.

So, what can we do to reduce these types of incidents? There are two key aspects from our point of view:

  • Reporting culture. Pilots are obligated to report these types of incidents, as they are mandatory notification events. Reporting also allows for the capture of safety-related information that is perceived as a real or potential safety hazard. It is essential to report not only impacts but also sightings.
  • Commitment and coordination of all Administrations. Airports establish wildlife control measures for habitat management with the help of various technological means such as falconry or pyrotechnics. However, they cannot act outside their area of competence. Therefore, the involvement of local and regional bodies is necessary to assume their responsibilities regarding the presence of landfills, environmental management, and factors that may lead to wildlife attraction points. This is precisely one of the weak points and is crucial for conducting proper risk analyses and reducing the number of incidents due to this cause.

Mechanical failures

Let’s now look at the measures taken to prevent airplane accidents due to technical failure. The main objective is to prevent technical failures from occurring, but if they do occur, measures are also taken to prevent them from causing an air accident.

Preventing technical failures:

With highly resistant structures and wide safety margins. Aircraft wings, for example, are designed to withstand loads 1.5 times higher than the maximum that can be encountered. In other words, they are designed to withstand much more than they will ever have to in the worst of flights.

Equipment, instruments, and systems also have high reliability. Additionally, studies are conducted to determine the safe useful life of different parts, so they can be replaced before being exceeded.

Conducting tests with prototypes to check and analyze the aircraft’s resistance. One of the tests that manufacturers must perform is structural fatigue testing, where, using an array of hydraulic actuators, loads are applied to the structures simulating all phases of a flight in just a few minutes. For the Airbus A380, this test lasted 26 months, during which 47,500 flights were simulated: 2.5 times the number of flights an A380 will ever make.

During these tests, micro-cracks that may appear with use are analyzed, and based on this, maintenance programs are developed.

Each airline has, for each aircraft, a detailed maintenance program based on the manufacturer’s and approved by the competent authority.

The maintenance program specifies the time interval between different inspections and the depth of each one: it lists both the checks that must be made and the parts to be replaced. There are “daily”, “weekly” and then type A, B, C, and D inspections. Some are carried out in maintenance hangars and others where the aircraft are parked.

During more thorough inspections, the opportunity can also be taken to modernize the aircraft by incorporating new equipment available in the aeronautical industry.

Before each flight, pilots check the general condition of the aircraft through an external inspection. Once inside, using the cockpit instruments, they verify the correct functioning of control surfaces, hydraulic systems, engines, electrical generators, navigation systems, alarms, etc.

Preventing a technical failure from causing an air accident:

Designing certain components and structures so that if they fail, they do so safely, without affecting other elements or the aircraft as a whole. For example, if certain engine parts were to detach in case of a serious engine failure, they would be contained by their own casing, preventing them from reaching the fuselage or wings.

On the other hand, it is quite rare for an engine failure to cause a fire in the engine itself, as they are designed to prevent this. Even so, for the most unlikely cases, there are 2 fire extinguisher bottles in each engine and, obviously, means to cut off the fuel supply.

With alarms and instruments that warn of failures and allow monitoring of systems, as the engines, control surfaces, electrical generators, instruments, etc. are filled with sensors.

They not only warn of failures but also of anomalies or unusual values. For example, in many cases where an engine fails, it’s not actually that it stops working on its own, but rather the pilots, as a precaution and to prevent it from really breaking down, have shut it off while diverting to an airport. Why? For instance, due to registering higher than usual vibration or oil temperature values.

With a high level of redundancy. This way, if one piece of equipment or system fails, there is at least another one that takes over its function.

For example, an Airbus A320 has 5 main flight computers responsible for transmitting signals from the pilots’ controls to the control surfaces. The 5 computers are designed and manufactured by 2 different companies, and it’s enough for 1 of the 5 to work. The aircraft has 3 electrical generators, each capable of supplying all the necessary electricity; additionally, there are also emergency batteries and the RAT. The control surfaces are moved by hydraulic pressure, and for this, the aircraft has 3 independent hydraulic systems. And like all aircraft, it can fly with one engine inoperative.

Having procedures to land safely despite failures. They indicate the safest way to act and, evidently, are practiced in flight simulators.

There are also procedures that “substitute” for the failing system. For example, normally landing is done with the flaps down, but in case they don’t lower, there is a procedure that allows landing without them. “Similarly”, and more basically, this occurs with the landing gear, as aircraft are designed to be able to land without wheels and, moreover, without causing a fire.

Maintaining a cautious attitude by considering that failures can occur at the most unfavorable moment. For example, it is taken into account that a depressurization can occur just when the aircraft is flying over a mountainous system with high peaks. For this reason, “escape routes” are established allowing emergency descent while considering the orography.

It is also taken into account that engine failure can occur right at the moment of takeoff, when the most thrust is required. Aircraft are designed to be able to continue it and, in fact, pre-takeoff calculations already assume engine failure at that moment; although it is very unlikely to occur.

Infrastructure

Airports, nowadays, are considered strategic installations. Not only for the economic development of an urban area or a nation, but of a continental region and its interaction via air with the rest of the world. The importance of security in strategic airport infrastructures is inherent to their integrity, functionality, and public service. In the airport context and its role in international civil aviation, when referring to the security of these facilities, it can be addressed in two main approaches.

Security approaches

The first is operational safety linked to the prevention of incidents and accidents, emergencies generated by their occurrence in aircraft, ground equipment, terminals, personnel, meteorological phenomena, or others of an unintentional nature, among which are considered public health emergencies of international concern.

A second approach is aviation security, which is aimed at preventing and avoiding attempts or acts of perpetration of unlawful interference (intentional) that compromise strategic airport infrastructures and put at risk aircraft, crews, passengers, baggage, cargo, and the general public.

This article will emphasize the second as the approach to protecting the airport as strategic infrastructure in air transport, its purpose and scope. And how the strategic facility must address it.

Security Design

This security, viewed as the protection of airports, must invariably be designed under a tripartite perspective: physical barriers (infrastructure and/or equipment), human capital (security personnel), and measures (operational procedures); if any of these are lacking, then it cannot be considered a complete measure of “civil aviation security”.

Once the composition of this “security” at the airport is defined, it must be described in an “airport security program”, which should be designed under a civil aviation security risk analysis with the help of various authorities and intelligence, in order to establish a real context on the threats to the airport facility.

In turn, the possibilities of these threats materializing (probability of occurrence and intentionality) must be analyzed, as well as the vulnerabilities of the airport infrastructure. Based on this risk analysis, “aviation security” strategies can be designed and incorporated into the airport security program. This program is an international standard, so its existence is mandatory.

Security Program

Among the elements or components of the airport security program, the following elements can be found in an illustrative but not exhaustive manner. Namely: organization, perimeter protection, security controls (passengers, employees, and vehicles), CCTV, baggage inspection system, security equipment (passengers, baggage, cargo), person identification system, security lighting and signage, among others.

This security program must consider, in turn, two perspectives: a “preventive” one, as an a priori defense mechanism, and a “reactive” one, as an a posteriori response protocol in case an act of unlawful interference (AUI) is perpetrated. In other words, airport infrastructures, whatever the operating regime of the aerodrome (public, private, or a combination of both), are obliged to have a security program that describes the measures in place to prevent and react to the commission of the aforementioned AUI. Within the preventive approach, measures contemplated for changes in threat levels should also be included, that is, changes or adjustments in preventive security measures for their improvement and reinforcement.

Additionally, strategic airport infrastructures have two general types of zones from the AVSEC perspective: a public part and an aeronautical part. In turn, the latter is considered within the restricted security zones that are defined as priority risk zones whose access is strictly controlled against unauthorized entries. These include passenger departure lounges, the ramp, baggage preparation areas, areas where aircraft are prepared for service, for baggage and cargo, mail centers, catering preparation facilities, and aircraft cleaning facilities.

Regarding the public part of airports (parking lots, transport centers, roads, corridors in terminal buildings, documentation or check-in areas, among others), it must also be protected. Therefore, it is important to note that the protection or security of the public area should be in line with the result of the aviation security risk analysis that has been previously mentioned.

Now, with reference to the reactive part, reactions to security contingencies must be considered once the AUI has been perpetrated. That is, when the support of competent authorities is necessary to regain control of air operations, terminal building, or aeronautical facilities. This reaction requires coordination and intervention at the airport, so the harmonized action of authorities and organizations linked to public order is crucial for the return to normality of the airport operation as a strategic facility.

Health Risk

On another note, and as a recent event, since 2020 there has been a health risk such as COVID-19, considered in the context of international civil aviation as a Public Health Event of International Concern. These events represent an operational risk due to the “contagion or spread” of the disease, for which it is necessary to establish health “corridors” or “aisles” (biosecurity measures) to/from aircraft for passengers and crews, as well as maintaining areas of lower risk of contagion for employees.

Finally, it is evident that strategic airport infrastructures are subject to threats and risks of accidents in aircraft operations, as well as health events that affect the world, since these facilities are nodes of connectivity and distribution of people and goods traffic in the productive chains of nations. This is the reason for their relevance as infrastructure that generates economic activity, tourism, and exchange of goods and services in the globalized world.

A good understanding of operational complexities, technological challenges, social environments, among other aspects impacting airports, will modify and adjust their performance and integrity. And, of course, the security of these strategic facilities, which cannot be removed from coexisting within a global aeronautical, economic, and health semi-sphere.

Terrorism

Although their strategies and tactics evolve over time, jihadist organizations with Salafist ideology such as Daesh and Al Qaeda continue to target civil aviation. The increase in ground control measures in response to 9/11 would have shifted classic threats such as aircraft hijackings, explosions, and in-flight suicide terrorism, in favor of a new spectrum linked to technological development, without implying that the risk has disappeared, also revaluing the weight of the internal threat. Starting from the premise that a person can be influenced to commit a crime against airport infrastructure, including one of this nature, we might ask ourselves if it is possible to indoctrinate a significant volume of individuals or if it is more likely that this would occur in isolated cases, so it would be advisable to identify agile methodologies for the early identification of signs of radicalization and permanently review security access and clearance criteria.

Terrorists, in any case, would have operated successfully where there are fewer control measures such as free access areas in airports, executing attacks with firearms and suicide bombings. Regarding emerging threats, such as the use of commercial drones and tools available on the internet for malicious purposes, along with the possibility of developing cyberattacks in the future, they would represent a significant danger, so measures should be adopted to improve security conditions in civil aviation in advance, in a dynamic contrary to the reactive one associated with accidental air catastrophes. In this sense, serious investment should be made in security protocols that represent both deterrent and defensive barriers against potential attacks, which ensure the safety of aircraft, surveillance and control systems, as well as air navigation and communication of airport facilities.

There is no absolute certainty or security. However, it is essential to develop a culture of comprehensive security in organizations that are part of and linked to the aeronautical sector in Spain, ensuring effective and permanent inspections and controls adapted to the evolution of threats. To have an adequate strategic framework, it is necessary to expand, clarify, and harmonize air safety provisions, betting on legislative and regulatory homogenization also within the EU, with adequate investment and efficient budget allocation.

On the other hand, implementing security control technologies against emerging threats in civil aviation also implies strengthening collaboration and knowledge exchange between public and private organizations, through an adequate flow of information between airlines and authorities operating in our territory, reinforcing bilateral and multilateral relations that facilitate adaptation to these measures.

Military Actions

Passenger planes have rarely been attacked by military forces in both peacetime and war. Examples:

  • In 1955, Bulgaria shot down El Al Flight 402.
  • In 1973, Israel shot down Libyan Arab Airlines Flight 114.
  • In 1983, the Soviet Union shot down Korean Air Lines Flight 007.
  • In 1988, the United States shot down Iran Air Flight 655.
  • In 2001, the Ukrainian Air Force accidentally shot down Siberia Airlines Flight 1812 during an exercise.
  • In 2014, Russia shot down Malaysia Airlines Flight 17.
  • In 2020, Iran shot down Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752.

Drones and
Air Safety

According to AESA, there are more than 3000 drone users in Spain, and the number keeps growing. This opens up many possibilities for insurance companies, as it is mandatory to have civil liability insurance when the use is professional (not so when it is merely recreational).

Technology has once again outpaced existing laws, and drones are increasingly involved in criminal acts, such as the incident that paralyzed part of London’s air traffic in December 2018: 40 drone sightings caused the closure of Gatwick Airport. No one claimed responsibility, and it’s still not known for certain how many people were involved. As a result, the UK government announced new UAV legislation that came into effect in March, which, among other measures, expands the protection zone of British aerodromes.

Finding a solution to this new type of crime is so pressing that INTERPOL published a set of global guidelines earlier this year for first responders investigating criminal incidents involving unmanned aircraft. These provide police and other first responders with procedures for handling cases where drones are part of criminal investigations, from tracking device use to obtaining digital evidence.

However, it’s important to note that these policies do not cover illegal use, such as flying in urban areas, over people, at night, or in natural parks or airports, which can result in fines of over €200,000.

In any case, when using them, the following is recommended:

  • Do not fly over prohibited areas, such as natural parks.
  • Do not use it in adverse weather conditions, such as rain or wind.
  • Use it during the day, when visibility is better.
  • Keep the drone at a distance that allows you to supervise it and at a maximum height of 120 meters.
  • In the case of use by a minor, it should be under adult supervision.

Benefits of
Air Safety

There are many advantages and benefits to addressing operational safety preventively as part of organizational processes in every company, a premise that follows the line of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). In this way, it is possible to detect potential risks or threats to safety and avoid their negative consequences. Thus, air safety is maintained at the highest levels, taking into account the necessary profitability of aeronautical activity.

The pillars on which any safety management system should be based are three: trust, leadership, and authority. In this sense, both the aviation authority and the senior management of operators must foster these values and promote a reporting culture among their professionals, for which experience and credibility are essential.

On the other hand, the main defenses to combat risks in aviation are regulation, technology, and training. Solid training and constant, quality practice are fundamental for pilots, as the highest authority on a flight, to be able to manage any situation, guaranteeing the safety of the flight and passengers.

It is also worth highlighting the importance of activities framed within the European Union’s strategy for cooperation with third countries. One of the benefits of international coordination is making industry knowledge available to the market, reinforcing cooperation mechanisms with other bodies in the aeronautical field, which allows for creating synergies and contributing to new business possibilities abroad.

In accordance with this premise, various organizations develop cooperation activities with third countries aimed at facilitating and enhancing the development and competitiveness of aeronautical and air transport industries, through Collaboration Agreements and/or Technical Assistance to improve air safety levels for the benefit of citizens using air transport.

WE ARE HAPPY TO HELP

If you have any questions,
you can write to us, we're listening

    Which program are you interested in? *

    INSTITUTO TÉCNICO DE FORMACIÓN Y CONSULTORIA AÉREA, S.L. “ITAÉREA” is a company whose main activity is OTHER EDUCATION-SPECIALIZED TRAINING and is the owner of the Website www.itaerea.es (hereinafter, the Website), located at Avenida Juan de Borbón 79, 30110 Murcia and CIF nº B-73694895 (hereinafter, “the company”).

    The company guarantees the protection of all personal data provided by the User on the Website and, in compliance with the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016, hereinafter GDPR, regarding the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and the free movement of such data and other applicable regulations, informs you that:

    a) The user whose data appears in this Form expressly consents to the company, the processing of their personal data in order to manage the services, as well as the authorization to communicate with those entities with which the company has entered into a service provision and promotion contract.

    b) All personal data provided to the company will be processed by the company in accordance with the RGPD and will be included in the WEB PAGE Processing Activity Register, created and maintained under the responsibility of the company.

    c) In the collection and processing of personal data, appropriate security measures have been adopted to prevent the loss, unauthorised access or manipulation thereof, in accordance with the provisions of the GDPR.

    d) The company undertakes to protect confidential information to which it has access.

    e) Under no circumstances will the company use the personal data that you make available to provide services to third parties other than those referred to in paragraph a) of this document or, where appropriate, to achieve its own utility.

    f) The User may, at any time, exercise the rights of access, rectification, cancellation, opposition, deletion or “Right to be Forgotten”, portability as well as limitation of processing, regarding their personal data, as well as revocation of consent for the company for any of the aforementioned purposes, by sending a duly signed letter to the company at our postal address Carril de La Condesa, 58 “Torre Proconsa” office 605-30010- Murcia, Spain or to the email juridico@itaerea.es, where contact details are clearly stated, which must be accompanied by a photocopy of your DNI/NIF or document proving your identity.

    g) The User authorises the automated processing of the personal data supplied in the terms indicated. To do so, please click on the "SEND" button after the contact form: